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JAMES S. DEAN, as Director of the Department of Finance 
et al., Petitioners, v. THOMAS H. KUCHEL, as State 
Controller, Respondent. 
[1] Fish and Game-Regulation-Validity of Statute Govern-
ing.-The Wildlife Conservation Act of 1947 is not unconsti-
tutional as an unlawful delegation of power, and mandamus 
lies to compel the State Controller to draw warrants for pay-
ments of salaries of employees of the Wildlife Conservation 
Board. (Stats. 1947, ch. 1325; Am. Stats. 1949, ch. 1440; 
3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 9250.) 
[2] Constitutional Law- Legislature- Extent of Powers.- The 
state Constitution is not a grant of power but a limitation 
or restriction on the powers of the Legislature. 
[3] !d.-Legislature-Extent of Powers.-Constitutional limita-
tions on the Legislature's powers should be strictly construed, 
and any doubt as to the Legislature's power to act in a given 
case should be resolved in favor of the action. 
[ 4] !d.-Distribution of Powers-Limitations.-Express enumera-
tion of legislative powers in the Constitution is not an ex-
clusion of others not named unless accompanied by negative 
terms. 
[5] Fish and Game-Regulation-Fish and Game Commission.-
As used in Const. art. IV, § 25¥2, stating that the Legislature 
may delegate to the Fish and Game Commission such powers 
relating to fish and game as the Legislature sees fit, the word 
"may" is at least reasonably susceptible of a permissive rather 
than a mandatory or prohibitory meaning. 
[6] !d.-Regulation-Fish and Game Commission.-That the Legis-
lature may, under Const. art. IV, § 25lj2 , delegate to the Fish 
and Game Commission such powers as the Legislature may 
see fit indicates that it may fail to delegate any powers. 
[7] !d.-Regulation-Fish and Game Commission.-In adopting 
the amendment of Const. art. IV, § 25¥2, establishing a Fish 
and Game Commission, the people did not intend to strip the 
[2] See 5 Cal.Jur. 666; 11 Am.Jur. 894. 
[4] See 5 Cal.Jur. 666; 11 Am.Jur. 890. 
[5] See 5 Cal.Jur.lO-Yr. Supp. (1944 Rev.) 1071; 22 Am.Jur. 696. 
McK. Dig References: [1] Fish, §8, Game, §6; [2,3,9] Con-
stitutional Law, § 2; [4] Constitutional Law, § 76; [5-8] Fish, 
§ 15, Game, § 6. 
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legislative and executive departments of all power with rela-
tion to fish and game and substitute a commission with un-
limited power in the field; nor did the people intend to place 
a straitjacket on the Legislature by requiring that, in its 
legislation in the fish and game field, it act solely through 
such commission. 
[8] !d.-Regulation-Fish and Game Commission.-Const. art. IV, 
§ 25lj2 , establishing a Fish and Game Commission, is not a 
special provision controlling over the general provision creat-
ing the legislative department. 
[9] Constitutional Law- Legislature- Extent of Powers.- The 
Legislature has all legislative power not expressly or by neces-
sary implication denied to it by the Constitution. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel State Controller 
to draw warrants for payment of salaries of employees of 
Wildlife Conservation Board. Writ granted. 
Frank K. Richardson, Ralph N. Kleps, Legislative Counsel, 
Chas. W. Johnson, Chief Deputy Legislative Counsel, and 
Joseph W. Paulucci, Deputy Legislative Counsel, for Peti-
tioners. 
Edwin J. Regan, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Bert \V. Levit, Chief 
Deputy Attorney General, Ralph W. Scott and W. R. Augus-
tine, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent. 
Robert L. Mann, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-In 1947, the Legislature passed the "Wild-
life Conservation Act of 194 7" ( Stats. 194 7, ch. 1325; Am. 
Stats. 1949, ch. 1440; 3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 9250). 
It declares that the "preservation, protection and restoration" 
of wild life in the state and maintaining "high productivity" 
thereof is the public policy of the state. To achieve those 
aims ''a single and coordinated program for the acquisition 
of lands and facilities suitable for recreational purposes and 
adaptable for conservation, propagation and utilization of 
the fish and game resources of the State is hereby established.'' 
(Id., § 1.) In the Department of Natural Resources (Pub. 
Resources Code, § 501) there is created a Wildlife Conserva-
tion Board, consisting of the President of the ]~ish and 
Game Commission, an employee or executive officer of the 
May 1951] DEAN v. KucHEL 
[37 C.2d 97; 230 P.2d 811) 
99 
commiSSIOn, chosen by the commission, and the Director of 
B'inanee. Three members each of the Senate and Assembly 
shall meet with the board and participate in its activities to 
the extent that such participation is not incompatible with 
their membership in the Legislature. (I d., § 2.) The board 
Rhall study and determine the areas and land in the state 
most sJ,itable for the production and preservation of wild life 
and· f<f recreation, and, as a result of such study, shall de-
termini what areas shall be acquired by the state ''to effectuate 
a coordinated and balanced program resulting in the maximum 
revival of wild life in the State and in the maximum recrea-
tional advantages to the people of the State," (I d. § 3) and 
may authorize the acquisition of such areas by the Fish 
and Game Commission or the State Public Works Board. 
The commission, when authorized by the board shall con-
struct such facilities as are suitable. Completed areas are 
to be managed by the commission. (Id., § 3.) The money 
in the Wildlife RBcreation Fund is available for expenditure 
under the act. Also in 1947, section 19627 of the Business 
and Professions Code was amended to create a Wildlife Resto-
ration Fund and with the direction that $3,000,000 per year 
be paid into it from the license fees from horse race meetings. 
(Stats. 1947, ch. 1327, § 1.) The Conservation Act repealed 
Budget Item 245 for 1947, which amounted to $1,400,000 for 
use by the commission in construction, improvement and 
repairs, and equipment. (I d.,· § 5.) 
[1] Pursuant to the act the board employed Seth Gordon 
to make a survey of conditions in California. Respondent, 
State Controller, has refused to draw warrants for the pay-
ment of the salary of Gordon and other employees on the 
ground that the act is unconstitutional. Petitioner seeks by 
this proceeding in mandamus to compel him to draw such 
warrants. 
The constitutional provision invoked states: ''The Legis-
lature may provide for the division of the State into fish and 
game districts and may enact such laws for the protection of 
fish and game in such districts or parts thereof as it may 
deem appropriate. 
'"l'here shall be a Fish and Game Commission of five mem-
bers appointed by the Governor, subject to confirmation by 
the Senate, with a term of office of six years . . . The Legis-
lature may delegate to the commission such powers relating to 
the protection, propagation and preservation of fish and game 
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as the Legislature sees :fit. Any member of the commiSSIOn 
may be removed by concurrent resolution of the Legislature 
passed by the vote of a majority of the members elected to 
each of the two houses thereof." (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 251h, 
as amended in 1948.) That section was originally added to 
the Constitution in 1902 and then included only the first para-
graph. By amendment in 1940, the second paragraph was 
added. The 1948 amendment made no change here pertinent. 
It is asserted that by reason of the above constitutional 
provision the Legislature has no authority to delegate to any-
one except the commission any powers relating to the protec-
tion, propagation and preservation of fish and game ; that 
under the rule of construction, expTessio unius est exclusio 
alteTius (the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of 
another thing), that result must be reached; and that, there-
fore, the Conservation Act is invalid because it delegates such 
powers to the conservation board. The applicable legal 
principles compel a contrary conclusion. 
[2] The fundamental rule has been stated by this court: 
''There is no express prohibition against the allowance or 
reimbursement for other expenses, but the respondent con-
tends that under the doctrine of expressio uni1ts est exclusio 
alterit~,s, since the Constitution specified two items which may 
be allowed, any other allowances are invalid. This argu-
ment oveTlooks the fact that our Constitution is not a grant 
of power but rather a limitatio11 or restriction upon the powers 
of the Legislature [citations] and 'that we do not look to the 
Constitution to determine whether the Legislature is author-
ized to do an act, but only to see if it is prohibited.' (Fitts 
v. SuperioT Court, snpm [6 Cal.2d 230 (57 P.2d 510)].) 
[3] If there is any doubt as to the Legislature's power to act 
in any given case, the doubt should be resolved in favor of 
the Legislature's action. Such restrictions and limitations 
arc to be construed str1:ctly, and are not to be extended to in-
clude matters not covered by .the language used." (Emphasis 
added.) (Collins v. Riley, 24 Cal.2d 912,915 [152 P.2d 169].) 
(See, also, City of Los Angeles v. Post War etc. Board, 26 Cal. 
2d 101 [156 P.2d 746] ; Delaney v. Lowery, 25 Cal.2d 561 
[154 P.2d 674]; 5 Cal.Jnr. 666-670.) [4] Specifically, the 
express enumeration of legislative powers is not an exclusion 
of others not named unless accompanied by negative terms. 
(Ex parte McCarthy, 29 Cal. 395; Macmillan Co. v. Clarke, 
184 Cal. 491 [194 P. 1030, 17 A.IJ.R. 288] ; Slavick v. Walsh, 
82 Cal.App.2d 228 [186 P.2d 35].) 
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There are numerous pertinent illustrations of the applica-
tion of that principle. The provision that the Legislature 
shall protect from forced sale a homestead for heads of 
families does not limit its power to provide homesteads for 
others than heads of families. (Hohn v. Patdy, 11 Cal.App. 
724 [106 P. 266] .) Provisions authorizing removal of officers 
by trial for misdemeanor in office and the recall of specified 
officers, the first including and the second not including those 
of an irrigation district do not prevent the Legislature from 
authorizing the recall of the latter. (Wigley v. South San 
Joaquin Irr. Dist., 31 Cal.App. 162 [159 P. 985] .) A grant 
of power to county boards of education (Cal. Const., art IX, 
§ 7) to ''control'' examination of teachers and ''granting 
teachers certificates,'' did not oust the Legislature of power 
to establish the requisites for a teacher's certificate. (Mitchell 
v. Winnek, 117 Cal. 520 [49 P. 579].) The court there stated 
(p. 525): "If, therefore, it be asserted, as it is here, in effect, 
that the power of the legislature to enact section 1503 of the 
Political Code does not exist, the restriction or limitation 
of that power must not only be found in the constitution, 
but the prohibition of its exercise must be clear. It must 
appear either from express words or by necessary implication. 
It is not asserted that there is any express prohibition, nor 
does the use of the word 'control' necessarily imply that the 
power of legislation upon the subject in question is prohibited 
to the legislature. Apparently inconsistent provisions must 
be harmonized, and each given some effect, if that be possible. 
To give the word 'control' the effect given it by the court 
below, some qualifying word, such as 'exclusive,' 'absolute,' 
or 'unlimited,' must be implied, since without implication that 
word does not necessarily imply that the legislature has no 
power to declare that holders of the specified diplomas should 
be entitled to certificates of the grammar grade.'' 
Here there are factors which not only create a doubt that 
the Legislature was to be restricted to acting through the 
Fish and Game Commission in legislating in the fish and 
game field, but there are indications that it was not to be 
so limited. 'l'he wording of section 25% points in that direc-
tion. It begins with the declaration that the Legislatttre may 
enact such laws for the protection of fish and game ''as it may 
deem appropriate." The commission is created and to it the 
Legislature may delegate such powers relating to fish and 
game as it sees fit. [5] The word "may" is at least reason-
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ably susceptible of a permissive meaning rather than manda-
tory or prohibitory, and it has been held that when such 
word is used it will not create a restriction on the legislative 
power even though the Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 22) 
also provides : ''The provisions of this constitution are manda-
tory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are de-
clared to be otherwise." (See Presno National Bank v. 
Superior Conrt, 83 Cal. 491 [24 P. 157]; People v. Nye, 9 Cal. 
App. 148 [99 P. 241] ; Mundell v. Lyons, 182 Cal. 289 [187 
P. 950) ; but see In re Cencinino, 31 Cal.App. 238 [160 P. 
167].) [6] That it may delegate such powers as it may 
see fit indicates that it may fail to delegate any powers. It is 
true that the provision may impliedly mean that it may 
or may not, at its discretion, delegate such powers, but if 
it does, they must be conferred on the commission. But this 
is not necessarily the meaning or a necessarily implied nega-
tive; nor does it eliminate any doubt. 
The important problems in the fish and game field have 
long been entrusted to the Legislature as the representative 
of all the people. ''The people shall have the right to fish 
upon and from the public lands of the State and in the waters 
thereof, excepting upon lands set aside for fish hatcheries 
and no land owned by the State shall ever be sold or trans-
ferred without reserving in the people the absolute right to 
fish thereupon; and no law shall ever be passed making it a 
crime for the people to enter upon the public lands within 
this State for the purpose of fishing in any water containing 
fish that have been planted therein by the State; provided, 
that the Legislature may by statttte, prom:de for the season 
when and the conditions under which the different species of 
fish may be taken." (Emphasis added.) (Cal. Const., art. I, 
§ 25.) Moneys collected under fish and game laws are to be 
used in matters pertaining to that subject and "the Legisla-
ture may provide for the division of'' such money. (Cal. 
Const., art. IV, § 25%.) It is said in In re Marincovich, 48 
Cal.App. 474,481 [192 P. 156): "Wild game (included within 
which is fish, People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 116 Cal. 397 
[ 48 P. 37 4, 58 Am.St.Rep. 183, 39 L.R.A. 581] ) always has 
belonged to all the people of the state. It is evident, therefore, 
that what the people of the state own they can alienate on such 
terms as they choose to impose, and that the Legislature, as 
the law-making representative of all the people, may dispose 
of the fish in the state's deep-sea waters on such terms as to it 
may seem best-subject only to the constitutional limitations 
May1951] DEAN v. KucHEL 
[37 C.2d 97; 230 P.2d 811] 
103 
against discrimination. Within those limitations, the Legis-
lature, for the protection of :fish, may pass such laws as to it 
may seem most wise. The measures best adapted to that end 
are for the Legislature to determine . . . '' [7] In view of 
those policies and principles, we do not believe the people in 
adopting the amendment to section 25¥2 intended to place a 
straitjacket on the Legislature by requiring it to act solely 
through the Fish and Game Commission thereby created. 
Nor does the argument presented to the voters for the amend-
ment shed a contrary light. The measure was entitled for 
the ballot : ''.Amends Constitution, .Article IV, section 25lj2 • 
Creates Fish and Game Commission of :five members, ap-
pointed by Governor subject to confirmation by Senate, with 
six year terms, removable by majority vote of Legislature; 
rotates terms by requiring terms of those :first appointed shall 
expire one each year. Empowers Legislature to delegate to 
Commission powers relating to protection, propagation and 
preservation of :fish and game.'' There is no intimation that 
the Legislature would be thereby prohibited from exercising 
other powers not delegated. The main thought was that it 
was empowered to delegate authority to the commission. The 
argument for this amendment states that it "will remove the 
Fish and Game Commissioners from political influence by: 
"1. Providing a nonsalaried board of :five commissioners. 
'' 2 . .Appointment of commissioners for staggered terms so 
that no one administration can dominate the commission. 
'rhis avoids a sudden reversal of policy. 
"3. 'I'he Governor's appointments of commissioners are to 
be confirmed by the Senate which will nullify poor appoint-
ments. 
''This proposition will give an opportunity to the Division 
of Fish and Game to manage the wild-life resources of the State 
on a basis of sound, scientific and factual knowledge by: 
'' 1. .Allowing Legislature to delegate regulatory powers 
to the commission so that regulations may be based on scientific 
knowledge rather than on supposition and hearsay from self-
interested pressure groups. 
' '2. .Allowing the commission to establish and follow through 
long term policies and plans for scientific :fish and game 
management. 
'' 3 . .Allowing the commission to employ and retain thor-
oughly trained personnel so that the management policies of 
'sustained yield without endangering future supply' may be 
effectively carried through.'' The matter chiefly stressed 
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is the right of the Legislature to delegate powers to the 
commission, probably out of an abundance of caution to avoid 
the possibility that such delegation would constitute an un-
lawful delegation of legislative power. The major thought 
is the enlargement rather than curtailment of the power of 
the Legislature in dealing with problems with respect to fish 
and game. 
There are cases which have applied the rule expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius in construing the Constitution. (See 
Wheeler v. Herbert, 152 Cal. 224 [92 P. 353]; In re Werner, 
129 Cal. 567 [62 P. 97] ; Spie1· v. Baker, 120 Cal. 370 [52 P. 
659, 41 A.L.R. 196] ; Martello v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. 400 
[261 P. 476]; People v. Wells, 2 Cal. 198.) In the Wheeler 
case the restriction was positive and express. In the Werner 
case the court was dealing with an express and direct delega-
tion of legislative power to cities and towns to enact police, 
etc, regulations (Cal. Const., art XI, § 11) and involved the 
:fundamental structure of the state and local government. 
'l'he Spier case involved the right of suffrage declared to be 
one of the "highest privileges" of citizens and was express 
and explicit. In the Martello case there was a complete 
change in the method of assignment of judges and a :former 
provision that had also been stated by statute was omitted, 
thus indicating an implied repeal of the statute. The court 
in the Wells case was dealing with the separation of powers 
and felt that the construction given was necessary to preserve 
the courts from the uncontrolled domination of the Legislature. 
It is urged by respondent that when the Constitution 
creates an office the Legislature cannot add to or detract 
:from the powers such office traditionally or theretofore pos-
sessed (see Love v. Baehr, 47 Cal. 364). The instant con-
stitutional provision, while it creates a Fish and Game Com-
mission, does not give it any powers, and, as seen, it leaves with 
the Legislature the power to give it such authority as it 
"sees fit." It cannot be lightly assumed that the people 
intended to strip the legislative and executive departments 
of all power with relation to fish and game, and substitute 
:for them, a Fish and Game Commission with unlimited power 
in this field. [8] For the same reasons it may not be said 
that it is a special provision controlling over a general pro-
vision (that creating· the legislative department). [9] It 
must be conceded that the Legislature has all legislative power 
not expressly or by necessary implication denied to it by 
the Constitution. It is not like a provision creating an execu-
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tive or judicial office, each of which departments 1s entitled 
to its sphere of authority under the separation of powers 
principle. The construction urged by respondent would re-
sult in a direct invasion of legislative power in a field in 
which such power has not been abridged by constitutional 
mandate. 
If the people, by the amendment here involved, desired to 
repose in the commission created therein the exclusive power 
to control the fish and game resources of the state, this 
objective could have been achieved by employing language 
similar to that used in the provision for the control of the 
liquor industry in this state (see Cal. Const. art. XX, § 22). 
There are objectives which the people may well have 
desired to achieve in adopting the instant constitutional 
amendment creating a Fish and Game Commission. They 
may have desired, as above noted, to make it clear, that the 
Legislature could, if it wished, delegate some of its powers 
in the specified field to such commission, regardless of the 
principle of separation of powers; that the members of the 
eommission should have six-year terms and thus achieve 
more stability in administration (see constitutional provision 
fixing four years as term of office, Cal. Const. art. XX, § 16) ; 
and that the commissioners could be removed by a concur-
rent resolution adopted by a majority vote of the Legislature. 
\Ve may not assume that the Legislature, by adopting the 
statute here involved, intended to defeat any of those ob-
jectives. 
Let the writ issue forthwith. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
